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Book Review: The Philosophical Foundations of Modern
Medicine
Keekok Lee explores the philosophical foundation of modern medicine, a link often ignored if not denied in the
literature. Lee argues that this relationship explains why modern medicine possesses the characteristics it
does. Nathan Emmerich finds the work to somewhat confused and more of a study of the philosophical
foundations of biomedical science.
The Philosophical Foundations of Modern Medicine. Keekok Lee.
Palgrave Macmillan. 2011.
Find this book:  
Contemporary philosophy of  medicine is a diverse and sometimes
f ractured subject. It ranges across phenomenological explorations of  the
patient, illness, and medical practice, and philosophies of  human biology
in both continental and analytic tradit ions. It can be inf ormed by historical,
social and cultural f actors or it can be entirely ahistorical, asocial and
acultural.
The conf licts of  the f ield can be clearly perceived in practice.
Philosophical debates about the nature of  medicine ref lect the competing
worldviews of  science and humanism, and an understanding of  the
patient as a biological organism and as a socially and culturally located
individual. Robert M. Veatch has suggested that the advent of  the modern
prof essional medicine was marked by a disruption in the dialogue
between humanist philosophy and a nascent scientif ic medicine. In his
view, this disruption ended with the advent of  bioethics. However, it remains an open
question whether bioethics opened the door to broader philosophical perspectives or if  our
understanding of  medicine maintains a narrow f ocused on all things ‘scientif ic’.
Such is my concern with Keekok Lee’s claim to lay bare the philosophical f oundation of  modern
medicine. The book has a somewhat more limited scope and what is in f act on of f er is an exegesis of  the
philosophical f oundations of  biomedical science, an account that is presented in three movements. In the
f irst movement we are of f ered a brief  account of  the af f inity between ‘philosophy’ and ‘science’, coupled
with the claim that an ontological volte-f ace made scientif ic biology historically possible. This volte-f ace is
the Cartesian reconception of  the organism as machine. In the second movement this ontological volte-
f ace is, literally, writ large. The result is, we are told, that medicine is not simply ‘medicine’ but, rather,
‘MEDICINE’ something which is also ‘ENGINEERING.’ This thinking is then applied to ‘some sciences’ and
‘some technologies’ of  biomedicine and thus the non-metaphorical truth of  the propositions that medicine
is engineering and organisms are machines have been established. The f inal movement presents an
account of  (monogenic) causality that purports to explain the inner workings of  the machine or, perhaps,
MACHINE. This f inal movement is closed by an account of  epidemiology which contradicts much of  what
Lee has philoscientifically established. The point of  this last chapter appears to be that dif f erent sciences
are underpinned by dif f erent philosophical commitments.
Whilst this is a relatively unobjectionable conclusion because there is lit t le crit ical engagement with
philoscientif ic account of  biosciences, one reaches it with some surprise. When reading this book I was
under the impression that Lee had been seeking to establish the ontological, or philoscientific, truth of  the
organism-as-machine ‘episteme.’ The never f ully discussed conclusion is that whilst this is true f rom within
the epistemic perspective of  the biosciences there are other equally scientif ic (and philosophical) but
dif f erent perspectives within which it is not true, such as epidemiology. Nevertheless this seems to run
counter to the path one has been invited to tread.
This book is not really a philosophy of  medicine but, rather, a philosophy of  the bioscientif ic worldview.
This limitation does not appear to be f ully recognised by Lee and thus when medical education is brief ly
mentioned, the author speaks of  ‘biomedicine’ and the way it is constituted by the clinical and pre-clinical
curricula (p.65). However Lee’s understanding is only really applicable to the pre-clinical aspect of  medical
education. Lee consistently talks of  ‘medicine’ but does not make clear that clinical practice is beyond the
scope of  her comments. Furthermore there seems litt le justif ication f or reducing the relevance of  the
patient’s phenomenological experience to medicine to the reporting of  symptoms (p.115-116) and there is
certainly no reason f or doing so without ref erring the reader to the distinction between illness and disease
and to work such as Carel’s celebrated book ‘Illness’ (2008). One could say that in making this point I am
crit icising this book f or not being something else, f or not being a philosophy of  clinical medicine, a claim
that has also been levelled at Evidenced Based Medicine. However Lee, and EBM f or that matter, invites this
charge precisely because they do not adequately recognise the limitations of  the philoscientific paradigm.
This f law can also be perceived in Lee’s lack of  engagement with the troublesome nature of  the placebo.
Certainly at the end of  chapter 8 she provides a reasonable discussion of  the placebo and notes the
implications “may well entail calling into question … the axiom of  body- is-matter- is-machine.” (p.112)
Nevertheless whilst this may well be entailed it is not carried through. Most subsequent ref erences to the
placebo are in f ootnotes and the axiom remains unquestioned. Indeed Lee adopts the ontology of
Scientif ic Naturalism in such a manner as to deny the metaphorical nature of  the organism-as-machine view
considering it ontological or categorical (by which I assume she means true). One of  her examples is that it
does not make literal sense to say that “Tuesday is red or Sunday is Green.” Such statements can only be
metaphorical. However in the phenomenological experience of  some synesthesiasts is can make literal
sense to say such things, nevertheless such individuals can recognise the truth of  such statements. What
this shows is that our ontological understanding of  days of  the week as not being amenable to having
colour properties is not pre-theoretical but theory laden. Our ontological grasp of  the world is not, as Lee
suggests (p.25), beyond language. Rather it is intimately and inescapably bound up with it. Thus whilst
some people have indeed ‘noticed’ “rivers and mountains are lif eless things [but] birds, f ishes and plants
are living things” (p.26) doing so embodies a theoretical perspective. Others have considered rivers,
mountains and, indeed, entire planets to be living things.
This being the case we might consider how philosophical f oundations of  the biosciences distinguish
between lif e and lif elessness. Lee embraces reductionism and rejects vitalism or any sense that, as a
whole, the organism is greater- than-the-sum-of - is-parts. The organism is a ‘naturally occurring mode of
being’ but to say such a thing of f ers litt le help in determining precisely when, f or example, twinning turns
one f oetus into two or if  an aspect of  ‘my naturally occurring mode of  being’ – the f lora in my gut – is itself
a naturally occurring mode of  being distinct f rom my own and vice versa. Indeed it is not clear that how Lee,
or the biosciences, distinguish between lif e and death. Hans Jonas suggested that vitalistic monism was
“replaced by mechanistic monism, in whose rules of  evidence the standard of  lif e is exchanged f or that of
death” and reading Lee it is dif f icult to disagree. Mechanistic organisms such as birds, f ishes, plants, and
human beings are ‘linearly causal’ and ‘monogenic.’ In contrast, rivers, mountains, planets, and populations
– the object of  epidemiological study – are causally multi- f actorial, non- linear and, theref ore, not
‘mechanistic.’ In the biosciences, lif e has come to be def ined as the mechanical body, which is to say the
f unctional dead body. If  this is correct then, ethically, modern medicine cannot be considered a bioscience.
Nor can its philosophical, or philoscientif ic, f oundations lie within the biosciences. To paraphrase Sartre,
medicine is a humanism, and there is lit t le humanistic about this book.
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